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Negative Gearing Redux 
George Fane and Martin Richardson  
hould the interest paid by landlords on loans used to finance the purchase of 
rented houses and apartments be tax deductible?  There is widespread 
agreement that interest payments should be deductible at least up to the 
amount of the landlord’s ‘net rent’ — meaning the actual rent, minus all expenses 
other than interest payments.  In this paper, we revisit Australia’s controversial 
‘negative gearing’ (NG) arrangements, under which investors can also deduct 
negative cash flows — defined as the excess of interest payments over earnings 
net of depreciation and other non-interest expenses — from their other taxable 
income.  We focus on NG of investments in rental housing, but the principles 
apply also to other investments, such as equities and bonds. 
Apart from a brief hiatus in 1985-87, NG has been a feature of the Australian 
tax system for many years.  It is one of the few exceptions to Sieper’s dictum that, 
‘[t]ax law is as inclined to deny tax-payers full loss-offset as economists are 
inclined to recommend it’ (Sieper, 1986:286).  Indeed, it is a double exception: not 
only does Australian tax law allow it, but many economists and other 
commentators have recommended that it should be denied, on the ground that it is 
a tax loophole designed to steer revenues away from the Treasury.  For example, 
Colebatch (2003) states: 
Tax Office statistics show that in 1999-2000, 54 per cent of rental 
housing landlords claimed to be operating at a loss.  They wrote off their 
entire rental income against tax, plus $3 billion of losses, saving 
themselves tax of more than $1 billion — which in effect, is then paid by 
other taxpayers.   
Criticisms of NG have recently been intensified by the view that it has also 
contributed to an unsustainable property boom.  Gittins (2003), for example, refers 
to ‘the negative-gearing loophole on which this whole rocky edifice [the property 
boom] is built.’   
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) has noted that Australia’s tax treatment 
of rental property is out of line with that in other developed countries and has 
urged ‘others more expert in tax matters than the Bank’ to examine ‘those areas 
where the treatment in Australia differs from that commonly seen overseas.’  In 
fairness, it should be noted that the Bank’s submission to the Productivity 
Commission Inquiry on First Home Ownership, from which these comments are 
taken, makes it very clear that they recognise the general validity of NG.  Their 
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submission suggests that any changes made to eligibility for NG should also apply 
to assets other than rental properties, so as to preserve, ‘the neutrality of the 
taxation system across investment classes’ (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2003:55.)  
Former RBA Governor Bernie Fraser is less enamoured of NG, however, and has 
been reported as calling for its abolition.   
While New Zealand, like Australia, allows full offset of interest (provided 
that the rent is not set ‘below market rates’, that is, provided that it is a legitimate 
rental), the UK, the US and Canada all limit the degree to which rental losses can 
be offset against other income for tax purposes.  The UK only permits losses to be 
offset against future rental incomes.  In the US there is an income ceiling above 
which such offsets are not permitted (and below which they may still be 
restricted).  Canada requires that a ‘reasonable expectation of profit’ be shown, so 
that what is construed as a deliberate loss-making investment cannot be offset.  
Clearly, then, from the Reserve Bank’s perspective, Australia’s NG provisions 
should be looked at more closely.   
Even political parties occasionally talk of revamping NG.  The Democrats’ 
Senator Andrew Bartlett, for example, stated in November 2003 that: 
[t]here is absolutely no doubt that unrestricted access to NG for property 
investors and the huge cuts to capital gains tax passed by Liberal and 
Labor a few years ago are major contributors to the current crisis in 
housing affordability… The Democrats repeat our call for a proper look 
at all the issues that are contributing to the crisis in housing affordability, 
including open ended negative gearing.  (Australian Democrats, 2003)   
Labor’s Mark Latham, on appointment as Shadow Treasurer in July 2003, 
stated in an evening television interview that NG was a policy that could ‘easily be 
under review’ but was contradicted the next morning by his then-leader, Simon 
Crean (see ABC PM (2003).) Such speedy retraction is unsurprising: as Warren 
(2003) notes, it is politically difficult to ‘take away’ something that has previously 
been ‘given’, particularly if it is capitalised into the value of property, so that its 
removal would cause a large loss to property owners.   
Another criticism levelled at NG relates to its interaction with other 
deductible expenses.  Kohler (2003) writes: 
the real distortion with negative gearing…lies in what can be claimed as 
a cost against the property when calculating the loss.  It’s not just interest 
and maintenance, but also a capital allowance, or depreciation, of 2.5 per 
cent.  That is fair enough if it’s plant and machinery, but a building?  
Most people buy buildings in the expectation that they will rise in value 
not decline…That’s why property is more popular than equities and 
bonds when it comes to negative gearing — you don’t get to claim 
depreciation against financial assets.   
Beyond confusing land values with building values, in our view this point 
should not be used as a criticism of NG, since the deduction to which Kohler 
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refers could equally be claimed by an investor whose property was financed 
entirely by equity.  Furthermore, whilst it is true that, ‘you don’t get to claim 
depreciation on financial assets’, equities are simply claims on a firm’s assets and 
the firm does get to claim depreciation on these (which will then show up in the 
value of the equity.)   
On the other hand, there are many proponents of NG, particularly in the real 
estate and financial sectors, who use the events of 1985-87, when claimable 
interest expenses were limited to the value of net rental income from the property, 
to argue (somewhat controversially) that the abolition of NG would cause massive 
increases in rents. 
A recent inquiry into first-home ownership in Australia by the Productivity 
Commission has highlighted the interaction of NG with other aspects of the 
Australian tax system, including capital gains tax (CGT.)  The Productivity 
Commission (2004:121,Recommendation 5.3) recommends that a review be 
initiated of aspects of Australia’s personal income tax regime that have led to a 
perceived over-investment in rental housing.  They stress that the focus of that 
review should be on CGT provisions but that adjustments to NG might be 
considered as a second-best way of addressing concerns with such investment.   
Our aims in this paper are twofold.  First, we wish to stress and clarify the 
point that NG itself is entirely appropriate, in the sense that it would be a feature 
of an ideal income tax system.  This point has been made by several 
commentators, most recently Evans (2004) and Quiggin (2003).  However, as 
some of the press reports cited earlier make clear, it is still widely misunderstood.  
As the Productivity Commission (2004) recognises, problems can arise in the 
interaction between NG and various second best features of the Australian tax 
system.  The second aim of this paper is to provide some estimates of the effective 
tax rates that result from these interactions, of which the most important is that 
between NG and the concessionary treatment of capital gains.  The arguments 
surrounding NG stress its impact on the demand for housing (particularly rental 
housing) operating, presumably, through a reduction in the effective tax rate on 
real income derived from owning such property.  Accordingly, we present 
simulations that attempt to estimate this effective tax rate under various 
assumptions about the extent of capital gains on housing and how they are taxed.  
In particular, we estimate the effective tax rate for four cases: with and without 
NG, under the current CGT regime (in which tax is paid on half of any realised 
nominal gain), and the regime that it replaced (in which tax was paid on the full 
amount of any realised real capital gain.)  
Negative Gearing in First and Second Best Situations 
The case for NG is that in its absence the income tax would cascade whenever 
investments in rental housing are financed by borrowing.  To see that the 
consequences of denying NG would be analogous to the cascading due to a 
turnover tax on sales, note that, just as a cascading turnover tax can be made 
irrelevant by vertical integration of upstream and downstream firms, so would the 
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denial of NG be made irrelevant if landlords and lenders re-arranged their 
portfolios to eliminate the use of debt to finance the ownership of rental housing.   
To illustrate the cascading of a turnover tax, consider a wholesaler who sells 
a good for $100 to a retailer who, in turn, adds $20 of value and sells it to a 
consumer for $120.  If a sales tax of 10 per cent is imposed on both the wholesaler 
and the retailer and levied as a percentage of the net prices then the former, to still 
net $100, charges $110 of which $10 goes to the taxman.  The retailer then 
charges $143, netting $130 after tax of $13 is extracted, to be left with $20 still.  
All up, the tax raises $23.  The problem with this turnover tax is that it cascades 
from one stage of production to the next: the tax paid by the retailer is levied not 
only on their value-added but also on the already-taxed value-added of the 
wholesaler (and on the wholesaler’s taxes as well.)  This problem can be undone 
by vertical integration: if the wholesaler and retailer integrate then the imposition 
of the tax on the integrated firm’s final external transaction (at $120) raises $12 
and yields a final price of $132.  It can also be undone by an appropriate 
adjustment of the tax base to transform it into a value-added tax (VAT), in this 
case taxing our wholesaler $10 (as 10 per cent of her value-added) and taxing our 
retailer $2 as 10 per cent of his value-added for total tax revenue of $12 again. 
Now consider the case of a house worth $400,000 that is entirely financed by 
borrowing at 10 per cent per year.  Assume that the annual net rent (before 
deducting interest) is $25,000 and that lender and owner both face marginal tax 
rates of 48.5 per cent — this is the top marginal income tax rate in Australia, 
resulting from combining the top scheduled rate of 47 per cent with the Medicare 
levy of 1.5 per cent.  Absent NG, the ATO’s revenue is $19,400, or 48.5 per cent 
of $40,000 (assuming that the borrower’s interest payments are still deductible up 
to the value of the rental income, that is, $25,000.  If no deductibility of interest is 
allowed whatsoever then the taxman also picks up 48.5 per cent of the rental 
income: another $12,125.)  When NG is permitted, however, the ATO collects tax 
from the lender on the $40,000 of interest received, but must allow the owner a 
deduction against other income of $15,000, which is the owner’s negative cash 
flow ($25,000 – $40,000).  The ATO’s net tax revenue is then $12,125 (that is, 
48.5 per cent of $25,000).  NG effectively nets out the $40,000 of interest 
payments — just as a VAT nets out upstream value-added — recognising that the 
net income generated by the asset (the house) does not include the servicing costs 
of its financing.   
A cascading turnover tax can be avoided (at some cost in managerial 
efficiency) by re-arranging firm ownership to integrate upstream and downstream 
firms; similarly, the cascading effects of an income tax system that denies NG can 
also be undone by a simple portfolio readjustment in which the original owner 
sells the house to the lender for $400,000 and uses the sale proceeds to pay off the 
loan.  In this case, the ATO’s net tax revenue would be $12,125 once more, but it 
would now collect it directly by taxing the net rent of $25,000.  Under this 
scenario, the original loan would have been paid off and there would be no interest 
payments to be taxed or deducted.  Tax revenue would be unchanged, but there 
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would be no scope for critics to complain that landlords were getting others to pay 
their tax for them.   
If, instead of remaining unchanged, the amount of tax collected were 
increased by the abolition of NG, as it presumably would be in practice, this 
would indicate that it is not costless for lenders and landlords to re-arrange their 
asset holdings to ensure that rental accommodation is wholly financed by equity, 
rather than being partly financed by debt.   
The mistake of those who regard NG as a loophole in the tax system is their 
failure to notice that the sum of the correctly measured real incomes of the lender 
and landlord, excluding their incomes from other sources, must equal the real 
income generated by the only relevant asset, namely the house.  Borrowing and 
lending do not add to the properly measured income generated by the house; they 
are merely ways of allowing landlords and wealth owners to specialize in the 
efficient sharing of the risks and hassles of providing real estate services.  The 
waste caused by denying NG would arise because it inhibits this efficient sharing 
process in much the same way that the replacement of the GST by a cascading 
turnover tax would inhibit efficient specialization in functions among upstream 
and downstream firms. 
There is, however, an important difference between the cascading of a 
turnover tax and the cascading of the income tax that would result if NG were not 
permitted.  Since landlords would not borrow to supply rental housing at a loss 
unless they expected the loss to be offset by a capital gain, the negative cash flow 
that can be deducted from other taxable income under NG must be approximately 
equal to the expected capital gains on a property that is entirely financed by 
borrowing.  If capital gains were entirely untaxed then the denial of NG — if it 
were not accompanied by portfolio reallocations of the sort discussed above — 
would merely result in the collection of income tax on these capital gains.  Though 
the critics of NG prefer to view it simply as a tax loophole, one could mount the 
following second-best case for its denial: even though capital gains on owner-
occupied housing and equity-financed rental housing escape the net of the income 
tax, NG should be denied so that income tax is at least collected on the anticipated 
capital gains on rental housing financed by borrowing.   
Since Australia’s present CGT regime taxes half of nominal gains on 
realisation, capital gains on rental accommodation are not untaxed, but merely 
under-taxed.  The denial of NG might therefore result in the income from rental 
housing being substantially overtaxed.  To investigate this possibility and to 
estimate the extent to which the income from debt-financed rental housing is 
undertaxed under the present Australian tax system as a result of the lenient tax 
treatment of capital gains, the next section of the paper presents estimates of the 
effective tax rate on the real income from rental housing under various 
assumptions about the method of taxing capital gains, the magnitude of the real 
gains on rental housing, and whether NG is allowed or denied. 
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Quantitative Estimates of Effective Tax Rates 
For full details of these simulations see Fane and Richardson (2004).  We have 
calculated effective tax rates on real income from rental housing in two cases, ‘no 
boom’ and ‘boom’.  In the ‘no boom’ case, we make the following assumptions: 
• Nominal interest rate:  8 per cent per year. 
• Rate of growth of rents and house prices:  3 per cent per year. 
• Rate of inflation of consumer price index (CPI):  2 per cent per year. 
• Marginal tax rate of investor and lender:  48.5 per cent. 
Our estimates are based on the assumption that the ratio of house prices to 
rents (where ‘house’ is a shorthand for ‘house or apartment’) is endogenously 
determined to yield zero expected pure profits (that is, after allowing for a normal 
rate of return to investors).  This depends on the length for which the investment is 
held, however, so we use the simple weighted average of the pure profits for 
rented houses held for 5 years and 10 years.  The parameter values assumed above 
then imply that the ratio of rents to house value is 3.0 per cent per year.  While 
ratios of observed annual market rents to house values are generally higher than 
this, net rents are obviously less than market rents.  The choice of 48.5 per cent for 
the basic income tax rate is explained above.   
The interest rate and inflation rate are chosen as being fairly typical of recent 
Australian experience.  The rate of growth of nominal rents and house prices is set 
at 3 per cent per year in order to give a realistic value of the ratio of net rents to 
house prices.  The implied rate of growth of real house prices of 1 per cent per 
year is slightly faster than the average rate of growth of real house prices in 
Australia in the period 1970-96, which was 0.8 per cent per year.  (Section 2.2 of 
the Discussion Draft of the Productivity Commission Report on First Home 
Ownership cites unpublished Commonwealth Treasury data according to which 
real house prices in Australia grew at 2.29 per cent per year, on average, over the 
period 1970-2003 and by 70 per cent, in total, over the period 1996-2003.  These 
estimates imply that real house prices grew on average by 0.84 per cent per year 
between 1970 and 1996 and by 7.9 per cent per year between 1996 and 2003.)   
Inevitably, there are many abstractions contained in this analysis and we 
ignore a number of options that might be embedded in an NG investor’s decisions: 
their sale decision might be triggered by moving into a lower tax bracket (for 
example, at retirement), they might be able to claim as business-related expenses 
trips to inspect the property or expenses for minor improvements (under the guise 
of maintenance) and so on.  Our goal is not to explain the actions of every NG 
investor, however, but to illustrate, in what we consider to be a fairly 
representative case, the interaction of NG and CGT in Australia.  The important 
point to note is that such tax avoiding, or evading, opportunities are not directly 
related to NG.  They are available to all owners of rental properties, regardless of 
the extent to which they are financed by borrowing and regardless of the extent to 
which the landlord’s interest payments are allowed as a tax deduction. 
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In recent years the rate of capital gains on housing in Australia has been far in 
excess of 3 per cent per year.  Our estimates suggest that this is because actual 
capital gains on housing have far exceeded those that were expected: had the 
actual gains been anticipated, investment in housing would have provided a free 
lunch, even to those whose houses were left empty.  So we also estimate the 
effective rate of tax on real income derived from rented housing when there is a 
‘boom’: an unanticipated doubling of house prices.  In our reported simulations, 
the evolution of house prices is endogenous and is determined by the stream of 
income generated by the house, so an unanticipated housing price boom is driven 
by an unanticipated increase in rentals.  So to obtain these estimates, we assume 
that two years after making the initial investment, there is an unanticipated 
increase in rents of 10 per cent and the rate of increase of rents and house prices 
rises from 3 per cent per year to 4 per cent per year.  These assumptions produce 
an unanticipated jump of 102 per cent in house prices two years after the initial 
investment, relative to what they would otherwise have been.  The average growth 
in real prices in this case is then 9 per cent per year over 10 years, just slightly 
over the actual 8 per cent average real growth in Australian house prices between 
1996 and 2003. 
Given the assumed time paths of rents, we calculate house prices and the 
associated amounts of tax paid in each year under four alternative tax regimes — 
negative gearing allowed, or denied; capital gains taxed according to the system in 
place in the period 1985-99, or according to the system in place since 1999.  The 
difference between the two CCT regimes can be clarified algebraically as follows.  
Under the 1985-99 CGT regime, the base of the CGT in year t as the result of the 
sale for $Vt in that year of a house bought for $V0 in year 0 was $(Vt – αV0), 
where α = Pt/P0 and Pt and P0 are the values of the consumer price index in the 
corresponding years.  Under the post-1999 regime, the corresponding amount is 
$(Vt – V0)/2. 
The payments of CGT depend on the period for which the investment is held; 
we run separate calculations for investments held for 5, 10 and 20 years.  We 
deflate all the annual tax payments to put them in real terms.  Next we calculate 
the real income — defined as the real net rent plus the real capital gain — 
generated by the house in each year.  The effective tax rates are defined to be the 
ratios of the present values of the real tax payments to the present values of the 
real income.  The present values can be calculated using either the net of tax real 
interest rate or the gross of tax real interest rate.  The estimates reported below are 
calculated using the net of tax real interest rate. 
For the reasons explained in the previous section of the paper, the income tax 
does not cascade if NG is allowed, and the effective tax rate is therefore 
independent of the gearing ratio, defined as the proportion of the purchase price of 
the house that the landlord finances by borrowing.  However, if NG is denied, the 
effective tax rate depends crucially on this ratio.  We report results for gearing 
ratios of both 40 per cent and 80 per cent.  We also assume that both the landlord 
and the ultimate lender face the same marginal tax rate of 48.5 per cent and the 
same nominal interest rate.  Under all tax regimes, we assume that if the landlord’s 
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net rent exceeds his or her interest payments on the loan used to finance the 
purchase of the house, then this excess is also taxable at 48.5 per cent.  We assume 
that if NG is denied, then the landlord pays no tax and claims no deductions if the 
interest payment exceeds the net rent.  In contrast, if NG is allowed, any excess of 
interest payments over net rent can be deducted from the landlord’s other income, 
which is taxed at 48.5 per cent.  The total amount of tax paid is the sum of the tax 
paid by the lender and the landlord, which includes any payments of CGT.  The 
latter arise only when the house is sold.   
 
Table 1:  Effective Tax Rates on Real Income from Rental Housinga 
Duration of investment:  5 years 10 years 20 years 
 Effective tax rate on real income (per cent) 
 Negative gearing allowed 
No boomc 52.7 51.3 48.9 Post-1999 CGT regimeb 
Boomd 27.8 28.9 29.2 
No boom 48.0 47.4 46.4 1985-99 CGT regimee 
Boom 46.2 43.7 40.6 
 Negative gearing denied (gearing ratio = 0.8) 
No boom 64.9 60.2 53.9 Post-1999 CGT regime 
Boom 38.1 39.2 38.8 
No boom 63.2 59.1 53.3 1985-99 CGT regime 
Boom 51.9 49.0 45.7 
 Negative gearing denied (gearing ratio = 0.4) 
No boom 52.7 51.3 48.9 Post-1999 CGT regime 
Boom 30.1 31.8 32.4 
No boom 48.4 47.7 46.5 1985-99 CGT regime 
Boom 46.6 44.5 41.9 
Notes: a Effective tax rates are calculated as the ratio of the PV of tax paid by both lender and 
house owner to the PV of the pre-tax real income received, as a consequence of this 
transaction, by both the owner and the lender. 
b Under the post-1999 regime the capital gains tax base is half of the nominal capital gain, 
on realisation. 
c Under the ‘no boom’ case we assume a nominal interest rate of 8 per cent p.a., inflation 
of 2 per cent p.a., a marginal tax rate for both borrower and lender of 48.5 per cent and a 
correctly anticipated rate of growth of rents and house prices of 3 per cent p.a.   
d Under the ‘boom’ case we suppose that 2 years after the house is purchased expectations 
of nominal rent growth rise (correctly) from 3 per cent to 4 per cent and there also is a 
discrete jump in rents of 10 per cent: these combine to generate a discrete rise in house 
prices of a little over 100 per cent at that point. 
e Under the 1985-99 regime the capital gains tax base is all of the real capital gain, on 
realisation. 
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The results of our simulations of effective tax rates are summarised in 
Table 1.  Under the assumptions of the ‘no boom’ case, half the nominal gain on a 
house is less than the rate of inflation, so that the post-1999 CGT regime is in fact 
less generous to investors than the 1985-99 CGT regime.  As a result, even when 
NG is allowed, the effective rate of tax on rented housing slightly exceeds the top 
marginal tax rate of 48.5 per cent, even for 20-year investments.  However, under 
the 1985-99 CGT regime, the effective tax rate is always slightly less than 48.5 
per cent and is decreasing in the length of the period for which the house is held.  
The reason for this latter effect (under both CGT regimes) is, of course, the fact 
that both regimes allow investors to postpone CGT from accrual to realisation and 
the longer the time till realisation, the bigger the benefit from this concession.   
In our view, an ideal income tax would tax real income from all sources at the 
same marginal rate for each taxpayer.  Administrative costs being equal, this 
means that CGT regimes can be judged by how close their resulting effective rates 
of tax are to the scheduled rates of income tax.  In our simulations, this means that 
the various CGT regimes can be judged by how close the resulting effective tax 
rates are to 48.5 per cent.  The results in Table 1 show that, given this criterion, the 
1985-99 regime is clearly superior to the post-1999 regime for the cases in which 
NG is allowed.  There are six cases to consider:  three holding periods (5 years, 10 
years and 20 years), and two assumptions about the magnitude of capital gains 
(‘no boom’ and ‘boom’).  The only case in which the effective tax rate is not 
closer to the scheduled rate of 48.5 per cent under the 1985-99 regime than under 
the post-1999 regime is in the ‘no boom’ 20-year case, when the current regime 
‘overtaxes’ by 0.4 percentage points and the previous regime ‘undertaxes’ by 2.4 
percentage points.   
As noted above, we derive two sets of estimates for the case in which NG is 
denied, which differ only in the percentage of the house value that is assumed to 
be loan-financed.  Both sets assume that investors know in advance whether NG is 
allowed or denied.  As in the case in which NG is allowed, the effective rate of tax 
on real income is always higher in the ‘no boom’ case, for each maturity, under 
the post-1999 regime than under the 1985-99 regime and, for each regime, the rate 
is always lower on longer maturity investments than on shorter maturity ones.  
Reducing the proportion of gearing on the house reduces the effective tax rate 
when NG is denied in all cases but, under the current CGT regime, it always 
remains above the scheduled rate of 48.5 per cent for all holding periods we 
consider.   
The effective tax rates for the cases in which NG is denied then range from 
54 to 65 per cent, when 80 per cent of the house value is loan-financed (and 49 to 
53 per cent when only 40 per cent is loan-financed) the exact number depending 
on the duration of the investment and the CGT regime in place.  Part of the reason 
for this over-taxation is that capital gains on rental housing are already taxed to 
some extent under both the present Australian tax system and under the system 
that was in place between 1985 and 1999.  Another part of the reason is that the 
losses deductible under NG include the inflation component of nominal interest 
payments.  Since lenders pay tax on their nominal interest receipts, it is 
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appropriate that borrowers should be able to deduct nominal interest payments.  
The faster the rate of inflation, the larger would be the cascading effect of denying 
NG. 
The assumptions underlying our estimates are inevitably arbitrary; different 
assumptions about the timing of the unanticipated doubling in house prices and 
about the proportions in which it is due to increases in the level of rents and their 
expected rate of growth would produce different estimated effective tax rates.  
However, we are confident that our ‘boom’ case gives the right order of 
magnitude for the effective tax rates that would result from an unanticipated 
doubling in house prices.  These rates are nearly all less than the scheduled rate of 
48.5 per cent that is assumed to apply to interest receipts.  The reason that this is 
true even for most cases when NG is denied is that capital gains, which receive 
favourable tax treatment compared to other sources of income, are so large in this 
scenario that they dwarf all other sources of income.  In this ‘boom’ case, the 
nominal gains are so large, relative to the underlying rate of CPI inflation, that the 
difference between real and nominal gains is minor.  Under the 1985-99 regime 
the favourable treatment of real capital gains results only from the deferral of 
taxation of gains, but under the post-1999 regime, there is the additional effect that 
tax is levied on only half of nominal gains.   
Conclusion 
At the beginning of our discussion of NG in first- and second-best situations we 
showed that NG is not a loophole in the tax system, but rather something that 
would be allowed in any system that taxed real income, properly measured.  The 
main weakness of the Australian income tax is the taxation of capital gains, which 
is a major loophole when gains are rapid, but errs in the opposite direction when 
asset prices grow at less than twice the rate of growth of the CPI.   
With respect to CGT, our estimates of the effective rates of income tax show 
that, judged by the criterion of how closely each regime approximates an ideal tax 
on real income, the 1985-99 regime is clearly superior to the present regime under 
a wide range of alternative assumptions.  Since the administrative costs of the 
1985-99 and post-1999 CGT regimes are the same, there is no justification for the 
adoption of the economically inferior one.  Compare our earlier formulae for the 
two regimes.  The only extra information needed to estimate tax liabilities under 
the former system is the consumer price index.  The cost to the ATO of making 
this index available to taxpayers is obviously negligible. 
We considered above a second-best argument that, because of the 
concessionary tax treatment of capital gains when asset prices are rising rapidly, 
NG should be denied so as to collect tax on the anticipated capital gains on rental 
housing financed by borrowing.  This second best case for denying NG has three 
weaknesses.  First, the denial of NG would not remove the incentives to over-
invest in rapidly appreciating assets, because it would not affect the taxation of 
such assets if they were financed out of equity.  Second, by taxing investments 
financed by debt more heavily than those financed by equity, it would distort 
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portfolio choices and create a bias against financial intermediation.  Third, it 
would exacerbate the existing bias in favour of owner-occupancy and against 
renting created by the non-taxation of housing services accruing to owner-
occupiers. 
In the last section of the paper we showed that the denial of NG would result 
in very substantial over-taxation of the income from debt-financed rental housing 
under plausible assumptions about the anticipated capital gains on housing.  We 
then discussed the results for the case in which, in addition to anticipated slow real 
capital gains, there is also an unanticipated doubling of house prices.  In this case, 
even the denial of NG is not sufficient to keep the effective tax rate on real income 
from debt-financed rental housing near the top marginal rate of 48.5 per cent, 
under the current CGT regime.  The reason is that if there is a very large boom in 
house prices, almost all the real income from rental housing accrues in the form of 
capital gains and these are grossly under-taxed by the present CGT regime, and 
would have been significantly under-taxed by the previous CGT regime, which 
did not tax real gains until they were realised. 
Even if over-taxing anticipated gains on rental housing is less inefficient than 
under-taxing them, it would be better still, for the reasons discussed above, to 
attack the basic problem directly by making the CGT as efficient as possible, 
rather than by trying to deal with its inadequacies by denying deductions 
elsewhere in the system that would be allowed under an ideal income tax.   
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